

XX Congreso Internacional de Ciberseguridad Industrial en Latinoamérica 2023 – Lima – 20.06.2023


#### INTRODUCTION

- President, CEO, Ampere Industrial Security, Inc.
- Former utility staff (telecommunications, water & electric)
- Drafter of NERC CIP standards and formal interpretations
- NERC CIP Supply Chain Working Group contributor
- First NERC CIP auditor/regulator
- Former Manager, CIP Audits and Investigations WECC Region (NERC)
- Former Principal Investigator US DOE National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization
- EnergySec Founder, Former Director, Former Instructor and President Emeritus
- SANS ISC456 Instructor: Essentials for NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection
- US Coordinator, Centro de Ciberseguridad Industrial (CCI)
- Cybersecurity Advisory Team for State Solar, NARUC/NASEO
- National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and Idaho National Lab (INL)
  Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) Energy POC Stakeholders
- DOE Solar Energy Technology Office (SETO) and National Renewable Energy Lab (NREL) Industry Advisory Board (IAB) for the Securing Solar for the Grid (S2G)
- Advisor to multiple industrial security hardware and software vendors
- GCIP, CISA, CRISC, CISSP-ISSAP, SSCP, NSA-IAM, CVI, TCP, SCP

## **OPERATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TODAY**



## O.T. CHANGES OVER TIME



# **ATTACKERS OVER TIME**



#### ATTACKER OBJECTIVES

- Loss
  - Loss of view
  - Loss of control
- Denial
  - Denial of view
  - Denial of control
  - Denial of safety
- Manipulation
  - Manipulation of view
  - Manipulation of control
  - Manipulation of sensors and instruments
  - Manipulation of safety

We have well-practiced plans for loss of view or control at a site level or for short periods

Plans are not comprehensive (ready) for when systems are available but do not perform as designed/expected

Few plans are ready for events when systems are available, but someone else is controlling them (possibly maliciously

#### ATTACKER TACTICS VS. DEFENSE


- ICS Opportunistic
  - Conficker, Petya/NotPetya, BlackEnergy 3
  - 2008, 2017, 2015
- ICS Focus
  - Dragonfly 2
  - 2016
- ICS Specific Access
  - BlackEnergy 2, Havex, Dragonfly 1
  - 2011, 2011, 2011, 2022-23

Governance, Standards, Regulation, Architecture, Cyber Hygiene Passive Defense


- ICS Specific Effect
  - Stuxnet, CrashOverride, Triton/Trisis
  - 2009, 2016, 2017, 2022-23

Operations, Resilience,
Cyber Engineering,
Active Defense







#### OT ATTACK INNOVATION




### **MORE VISIBILITY**



#### MORE BLINKING LIGHTS



### MORE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE



# **INNOVATION OR DISRUPTION?**



### MANAGING ALL RISKS ALL THE TIME

- Hackers are faster than laws, regulation, standards, norms
- You can not possibly know every zero day in advance
- You can not possibly know every new adversary tactic in advance
- If you bought/implemented every security tool available, would you be secure?
- If you were compliant to every regulation and standard, would you be secure?
- How much better would your security be if you had enough welltrained security professionals?

#### ADAPTABLE PROTECTION

- Culture eats security controls for breakfast
- IDS and "APS"
- Creativity use existing tools in new and creative ways
- You are protecting against a skilled human (or many) with powerful tools; respond with the same
- OT technology span has both a time spectrum and innovation spectrum; train for both

# THE BEST SECURITY YOU CAN BUY



#### **CONTACT ME**

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