



The New Resilience in Industrial Cybersecurity

CCI: XVI International Congress of experiences in Industrial Cybersecurity – September 30 2021

INTRODUCTION

- Centro de Ciberseguridad Industrial (CCI) US Coordinator
- Former utility staff (telecommunications, water & electric)
- First NERC CIP auditor in the US
- Drafter of NERC CIP standards and formal interpretations
- NERC CIP Supply Chain Working Group contributor
- Former Principal Investigator US DOE National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization
- EnergySec Founder, Director and President Emeritus
- Cybersecurity Advisory Team for State Solar, NARUC/NASEO
- Advisor to multiple industrial security product vendors
- GCIP, CISA, CRISC, CISSP-ISSAP, SSCP, NSA-IAM, CVI, TCP, SCP

The background of the slide is a black and white photograph of ancient Egyptian relief carvings. The top section shows a figure on a horse or chariot, and the bottom section shows a group of people, some carrying loads on poles balanced across their shoulders, and a pack animal. The central text is overlaid on a dark horizontal band.

THE OLD WAY

RESILIENCE WITH LIMITATIONS

- Something breaks – fix it
- Incidents (accidental or malicious) limited to one or a small number of systems
- Incident response and disaster recovery
 - Rarely tested
 - Few documented IR/DR plans
 - Limited root cause analysis
 - Few documented lessons learned
- Often requires highly specialized knowledge
 - Unique mix of systems and applications
 - Specific to plant/location
 - Historical knowledge of system environment
 - Sequence matters

REACTIVE AND SPECIALIZED

- Little if any situational awareness
 - Unable to see problem happening in early stages
 - Unable to stop problem from becoming worse
- Little if any environment telemetry
 - Unable to see impacts on environment
 - Unable to infer issues based on other system behavior
- Critical systems and applications difficult to restore
 - Legacy hardware and software
 - Undocumented configurations
 - May or may not have backups, build documents
 - Licensing issues and end-of-life platforms



ASSET INVENTORY

- Not everything, but at least the critical systems
- You must know what you have to protect it
- All other key control areas are based on this
- Start with simple baseline elements
 - Make/model
 - Network and/or or host address
 - OS and/or firmware
 - All other software installed
 - Listening Ports (services)
 - Patches (or patch state; vulnerability)
 - Latest configuration(s)

PHASE OUT FRAGILE SYSTEMS

- Legacy systems
- Custom systems
- Unique systems
- That one application written by 3 engineers
- Brittle and unreliable hardware
- Borrowed IT used as OT
- Applications that don't work well with other tech
- Applications that are the hardest to update
- Standardization will lower costs/risk and improve uptime

ARCHITECT FOR DEFENSE

- MINIMUM - a firewall between IT/OT with strict rules
- Specific points for detection and visibility
 - Network boundary
 - Each network segment
 - Critical systems
 - Administrative & engineering systems
- Dependencies on outside systems
- Dependencies on outside business processes
- Intelligent islanding, shear-away networks & “turtle mode”

CONTROL CHANGE

- Best defense against both accidents and malice...
- Establish a change control/review board – at least for the critical systems
- Prepare for backing out any change
- Record all changes through baseline tracking
- Include changes into build/restore documentation
- Test changes, whenever/wherever possible

LOGGING AND MONITORING

- Log and monitor as much as you possibly can
- Network monitoring
- System monitoring
- SIEM tools
 - Tuning
 - Monitoring and alerts
 - False positives
 - Integration with other tools
- OT-specific tools exist
- Integrate with enterprise for the full picture
 - Most attacks start on the IT side of the organization

KEEP IT SIMPLE

- Don't over-buy security technologies
- Train your staff
- Complexity is the enemy of security
- Reduce technology diversity
 - Standardize tech blueprint (software and hardware)
 - Standardize configurations; control "drift"
- Fewer places for attackers (or problems) to hide
- Reduces attack surface area
- Less expensive through volume purchase
- Easier on supply chain risk

RESPONSE AND RECOVERY

- Write down an Incident Response Plan (IRP)
- Keep it simple – something you can follow
- Practice, practice, practice then practice more
- Are you sure you can recover – even from destructive malware? Have you tried to do this?
- Is your supply chain ready?
- Which processes can go to “manual?”
- Can you continue operating through the attack?

FRAMEWORKS AND METRICS


- Where do you start? Is there a playbook?
- Pick one, apply it, and measure to it
- Start with a gap assessment (good, but not required)
- IEC 62443; NIST-800-53 and 800-82
 - Map to other standards as needed
 - "High water mark" for multi-standard environments
 - Understand one-way "mapping" limitations
- **KEY:** consistent measurement to demonstrate progress



THE NEW WAY

THE NEW OT RESILIENCE

- Know what you have and how to protect it
- Modernize, standardize and simplify
- Build a network you can see and defend
- Change control and configuration management
- Monitor as much as possible
- Practice response and recovery like it's "game day"
 - Prepare for catastrophic scale events
- Anticipate and predict the problem before it happens
- Training and tools for staff to succeed
- Be able to continue operating through the attack
- CCI methodologies – RECIN and ESCIM



CONTACT ME



@PATRICKCMILLER



LINKEDIN.COM/IN/MILLERPATRICKC



PMILLER@AMPERESEC.COM



WWW.AMPERESEC.COM



+15032721414

